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ABSTRACT
Many scholars have commented that the state action doctrine forecloses use of the
First Amendment to constrain the policies and practices of online service providers. But
few have comprehensively studied this issue, and the seminal article exploring
“[c]yberspace and the [s]tate [a]ction [d]ebate” is fifteen years old, published before the
U.S. Supreme Court reformulated the federal approach to state action. It is important to
give the state action doctrine regular scholarly attention, not least because it is increasingly
clear that “the private sector has a shared responsibility to help safeguard free expression.”
It is critical to understand whether the First Amendment has a role to play in the private
sector, as Internet companies continue to develop and enforce their own content rules—as
“lawyers at Facebook and Google and Microsoft” exercise “more power over the future of
. . . free expression than any king or president or Supreme Court justice.” They are the
“sovereigns of cyberspace.” This Article analyzes the state action doctrine as it exists
today, examining: (1) how it distinguishes the public and private spheres, and (2) whether
it forecloses the First Amendment’s application to nongovernmental Internet companies,
specifically third–party platforms like Facebook and Twitter. The Article concludes that
the state action doctrine does foreclose such an application. And with that in mind, the
author suggests a state action theory suitable for the digital world.
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INTRODUCTION
We cannot think about [the state action problem] too much; we
ought to talk about it until we settle on a view both conceptually
and functionally right.1
—Professor Charles L. Black, Jr.

The Internet exists in an architecture of privately owned websites,
servers, routers, and backbones.2 Though this architecture enables Internet
users to speak online,3 it has also enabled companies like Google and
Facebook to conduct “private worldwide speech ‘regulation’”4 as they
create and enforce their own rules regarding what types of user content are

1. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term—Foreword: “State
Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 70
(1967).
2. David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study
of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 373, 377 (2010).
3. Id.
4. Susan Benesch & Rebecca MacKinnon, The Innocence of YouTube, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Oct. 5, 2012), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/05/the-innocence-of-youtube/.
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permissible on their platforms.5 Essentially, the companies are developing
a de facto free speech jurisprudence, and in doing so they appear to be free
to devise their content rules unconstrained by constitutional limits,
including those imposed by the First Amendment.6 The basic reason: the
companies are nongovernmental entities.
Scholars have noted that online intermediaries appear to operate outside
of constitutional strictures. Professor David Ardia says that “[w]hat many
consider the largest public space in human history is not public at all.”7
Professor Jeffrey Rosen says it is challenging to protect “values like privacy
and free speech in the age of Google and Facebook, which are not formally
constrained by the Constitution.”8 Professor Jack Balkin says that as “our
economic and social lives are increasingly dominated by information
technology and information flows, the First Amendment seems increasingly
irrelevant to the key free speech battles of the future.”9 Underlying these
comments is the state action doctrine, which dictates that the federal
government lacks the “power to regulate the policies and practices of private
entities under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”10 Recall that the
First Amendment begins: “Congress shall make no law . . . .”11 And the
Fourteenth Amendment, which has been read to apply the First Amendment
to the states, includes the command: “No state shall . . . .”12 A threshold
question in all First Amendment cases, therefore, is whether an alleged
violation was committed by a government actor.13

5. See Somini Sengupta, On Web, a Fine Line on Free Speech Across the Globe,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-theweb-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html.
6. See id.
7. Ardia, supra note 2, at 377. ͒
8. Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: Facebook, Google, and the Future of Privacy and
Free Speech, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 81 (Jeffrey
Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011).
9. Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV.
427, 427 (2009).
10. Developments in the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1250 (2010) [hereinafter State Action and the Public/Private
Distinction].
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added); see also EUGENE VOLOKH, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES: PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS
1 (4th ed. 2011).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added); see also VOLOKH, supra note 11, at
1. ͒
13. VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 1. ͒
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Courts so far have held that private online service providers are not state
actors for First Amendment purposes.14 However, few scholars have
directly addressed the problem of the state action doctrine and its
application to such providers, and those scholars mostly have done so in
special contexts like virtual worlds or government–operated webpages, or
in a discussion of a larger topic like the power that intermediaries exercise
over speech.15 Moreover, the seminal article exploring “[c]yberspace and
the [s]tate [a]ction [d]ebate” is fifteen years old, published before the U.S.
Supreme Court handed down a decision reformulating the federal approach
to state action.16 Now is the time to give the doctrine more scholarly
attention—as Professor Charles Black said, to “talk about it until we settle
on a view both conceptually and functionally right”17—because Internet
policy discussions worldwide are converging on the idea that “the private

14. See, e.g., Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Sols., Inc., 202 F.3d 573 (2d Cir. 2000);
Island Online, Inc. v. Network Sols., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Nat’l AI Advert., Inc. v. Network Sols., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D.N.H. 2000); CompuServe,
Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Am. Online, Inc. v.
Cyber Promotions, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
15. See, e.g., Ardia, supra note 2; Rosen, supra note 8; Balkin, supra note 9; see also
Eric Goldman, Speech Showdowns at the Virtual Corral, 21 S ANTA C LARA COMPUTER &
H IGH T ECH. L.J. 845, 851–53 (2005) (considering the tension between free speech rights
and private property rights in the context of virtual worlds, and arguing that virtual worlds,
like other online providers, do not merit special rules); James Grimmelmann, The Internet
is a Semicommons, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2799, 2816–18 (2010) (arguing that the Internet
is a semicommons and that the interplay between its private and common characteristics
explains some of the enduring tensions in Internet law, including those under the state
action doctrine); Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the
First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 988 (2008) (showing that intermediaries
have power over speakers but no responsibility to the speakers in using that power, and
that “the First Amendment does not currently require a particular solution”); Christopher
S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated Experience, 78
GEO. W ASH. L. REV. 697, 700 (2010) (discussing the fact that “[d]espite the best efforts
of some advocates to expand the scope of the First Amendment, it remains a limit on
governmental action that does not reach private action,” even those of Internet
intermediaries); David S. Ardia, Government Speech and Online Forums: First
Amendment Limitations on Moderating Public Discourse on Government Websites, 2010
BYU L. REV. 1981, 1985–2010 (2010) (discussing why the First Amendment’s public
forum doctrine is ill–suited to address the problems created when the government engages
in expressive activities online).
16. See generally Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The
Cultural Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1263, 1263 (2000).
17. Black, supra note 1, at 70.
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sector has a shared responsibility to help safeguard free expression.” 18 In
the United States, it is critical to study and understand whether the First
Amendment has any role to play in the private sector as “lawyers at
Facebook and Google and Microsoft” exercise “more power over the future
of . . . free expression than any king or president or Supreme Court
justice.”19 They are the “sovereigns of cyberspace.”20 Against that
background, this Article offers a singular examination of the First
Amendment’s application to nongovernmental Internet companies,
specifically third–party platforms like Facebook and Twitter. This Article
explores the state action doctrine, focusing on: (1) how it distinguishes the
public and private spheres, and (2) whether it forecloses the First
Amendment’s application to nongovernmental third–party platforms.
This Article begins with a general analysis of the doctrine and its
traditions and values, as well as its historical distinction between public and
private spheres.21 Then, the Article explores the law of public forums in
order to analyze the similarity between third–party platforms and public
forums.22 And, finally, the Article concludes that the state action doctrine,
under its latest reformulation by the Supreme Court, does foreclose the First
Amendment’s application to private Internet companies like Facebook and
Twitter.23 With that in mind, the author suggests a state action theory
suitable for the digital world that would enable judges to balance the rights
of property owners with those of property users and be able to characterize
a space as public for state action purposes even if it did not qualify as a
traditional public forum.24
II.

STATE ACTION DOCTRINE: GENERAL ISSUES

The state action doctrine, first articulated in 1883 in the Civil Rights
Cases, is one of the “most complex and discordant doctrines in American

18. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom at the
Newseum, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 21, 2010), https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.
19. Terry Gross & Jeffrey Rosen, Interpreting the Constitution in the Digital Era,
NPR (Nov. 30, 2011, 12:13 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/30/142714568/interpreting
-the-constitution-in-the-digital-era.
20. REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE
STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM xiv (2012).
21. See infra Part II. ͒
22. See infra Part II. Section E. ͒
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part III. Section C. ͒
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jurisprudence.”25 For years, it held that the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Bill of Rights restricted only governmental action.26 However, as the
doctrine evolved, it came to apply far more widely—even to actions of
private individuals and entities. For example, in the 1946 case Marsh v.
Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Alabama violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments by forbidding a Jehovah’s Witness from
distributing religious materials in a privately–owned town.27
The challenge of applying the doctrine today lies at the juncture
explored in Marsh, where the private and public spheres meet. It is a
challenge not only because the doctrine is “complex and discordant” but
also because of increasing privatization that has significantly “altered the
foundation upon which the traditional understanding of the public/private
distinction has been built.”28 Such privatization has touched many areas of
public life, from prisons29 to hospitals30 to schools31 to development
agencies32 and beyond.
There is a need, then, for a continuing discussion of the proper
boundaries of the state action doctrine,33 which remains as important today
as it was in the last century.34 The doctrine has emerged fitfully, and the
public/private distinction has evolved over time.35 For those reasons, the
doctrine and distinction have been targets of scholarly criticism.36 The

25. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1250; see also
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 505 (1985)
(describing the views of commentators that the state action doctrine is so incoherent that it
“never could be rationally or consistently applied”).
26. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883).
27. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
28. See, e.g., State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1250–
51.
29. See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437
(2005).
30. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 239 (1995).
31. See Valerie Strauss, A Primer on the Damaging Movement to Privatize Public
Schools, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answersheet/wp/2016/01/07/a-primer-on-the-damaging-movement-to-privatize-public-schools/.
32. See Swaney v. Tilford, 898 S.W.2d 462, 463 (Ark. 1995). ͒
33. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1251.
34. Id. at 1250.
35. See id. at 1311–12.
36. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 577, 610–11 (1997) (describing various
examples of the criticism).
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doctrine has been described as “incoherent,”37 a “conceptual disaster
area,”38 a “failure,”39 and a ruse to advance subjective policy goals.40 Some
scholars have called for the doctrine’s abandonment “in favor of a balancing
approach that focuses on constitutional values.”41
But other scholars have defended the doctrine for its role in “preserving
the primacy of the law of a written constitution,”42 and the Supreme Court
continues to use the doctrine to analyze constitutional claims in a range of
contexts, such as racial discrimination, creditors’ rights, defamation, and
antitrust.43 Historically, the Justices have used one of two tests to apply the
doctrine, finding the conduct of a private actor to be state action where: (1)
“the private actor performs a public function”; or (2) the private actor
“performs a private function that has a close ‘nexus’ to, or ‘entanglement’
with, the government.”44 Those tests represent a “threshold requirement” of
government or quasi–government action for “judicial consideration of
constitutional claims and congressional enforcement of constitutional
rights.”45
In the last thirty–five years, the Supreme Court has merged those tests
within a single two–part framework,46 under Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,47
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,48 and Georgia v. McCollum49:
The first inquiry is “whether the claimed [constitutional]
deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege
having its source in state authority.” . . . The second inquiry is
whether the private party charged with the deprivation can be
described as a state actor. In resolving that issue, the Court [has]
found it useful to apply three principles: (1) “the extent to which
the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits”; (2)
37. Michael J. Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action Doctrine,
28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 683, 683 (1984).
38. Black, supra note 1, at 95.
39. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1149 (1978).
40. See, e.g., Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the
Fourteenth Amendment “State Action” Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221, 230.
41. Reuben, supra note 36, at 610.
42. Id. (citing Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private
Distinction, and the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329, 337–
43 (1993)).
43. See id. at 610–11. ͒
44. Id. at 611. ͒
45. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1255. ͒
46. Reuben, supra note 36, at 611–12.
47. 457 U.S. 922 (1982)
48. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
49. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
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“whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental
function”; and (3) “whether the injury caused is aggravated in a
unique way by the incidents of governmental authority.”50

This so–called Lugar–Edmonson framework lends support to
commentators who have argued that the chief concern of the state action
doctrine is to balance public interests and private harms. 51 The pressing
issue is determining what facts can trigger the finding of state action, a
finding that “generally occurs when the complained-of conduct touches the
most fundamental of constitutional concerns.”52
A.

BACKGROUND

To understand where the doctrine is today, it is important to understand
from where it came. As noted above, the Supreme Court articulated the
doctrine in 1883 in the Civil Rights Cases, invalidating the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 and holding that Congress lacked the power to enact legislation
regulating private racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.53
That law penalized the private owners of places of public accommodation
who discriminated based on race. Justice Joseph P. Bradley, writing for the
majority, distinguished private and public wrongs, noting that where a
wrongful act is not “sanctioned in some way by the state, or . . . done under
state authority, [the victim’s] rights remain in full force, and may
presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the state for redress,” but
not by resort to the Constitution.54
Justice Bradley saw violations of the constitutional rights of one private
actor by another as a “conceptual impossibility.”55 Theoretically, his
distinction between private and public wrongs promoted the “individualist
goal of self-realization . . . by protecting the sphere of private conduct from
judicial inquiry,” as long as the private conduct did not violate state statutes
or the common law.56 Thus, Justice Bradley found that Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not authorize Congress to regulate private
conduct, writing, “[u]ntil some State law has been passed, or some state
action . . . has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 51 (citations omitted).
Reuben, supra note 36, at 612.
Id.
State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1256.
See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1257.
Id.
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protected by the fourteenth amendment, no legislation of the United States
under said amendment . . . can be called into activity . . . .”57
In the seventy years following the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme
Court reworked the state action doctrine significantly.58 The reworking
reflected the Court’s “concern with the failure of existing legal rules to
address troubling instances of racial discrimination,” ultimately signaling a
dramatic shift from “formalist reasoning toward functionalist and
instrumentalist reasoning.”59 The doctrine’s leading critic in the mid–
twentieth century was Professor Charles Black, who believed the doctrine
was “the most important problem in American law.”60 He focused on the
law’s role in addressing systemic racism, and he argued that the law was
failing to play its role because of the state action doctrine’s willful blindness
to nongovernmental actions.61
Black dedicated much of his attention to Reitman v. Mulkey, in which
the Supreme Court considered a provision of California’s Constitution that
prohibited the state from enacting laws limiting a private actor’s discretion
in the use of his or her real property.62 Justice Byron White, writing for the
majority, adopted a functionalist and instrumentalist approach, focusing on
“the necessity for a court to assess the potential impact of official action in
determining whether the State has significantly involved itself with
invidious discriminations.”63 The lower court had analogized California’s
constitutional prohibition on state enactment of antidiscrimination laws
with a state statute authorizing racial discrimination, an analogy White
accepted because he viewed the impact to be the same.64
On this basis, the Court rejected the distinction between “state action
and inaction” that was at the heart of the Civil Rights Cases and invalidated
California’s provision because it encouraged or involved the state in
authorizing private discrimination.65 Black defended Reitman because it
rejected the state action doctrine’s early formalism but did not reject the
doctrine altogether, a position Black shared.66 He wanted to harmonize the
57. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13.
58. See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1258.
59. Id. (citing Phillips, supra note 37, at 699–700, 734–35).
60. See Black, supra note 1, at 69.
61. See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1259.
62. Id. at 1259–60.
63. See 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967).
64. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1260.
65. Id.
66. See Black, supra note 1, at 82 (discussing Black’s proposal for the rule in
Reitman).
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doctrine with the “demands of justice”67 and thought it was insensible for
the doctrine to act as an impediment to the resolution of the great problems
of the day.68
B.

MODERN INTERPRETATION

Under the current conception of the state action doctrine, the line
between the public and private spheres is blurry. Scholars calling for the
doctrine’s abandonment have done so because they believe it is “an abuse
of deduction that ignores competing rights and interests,” and scholars
defending the doctrine have done so because they believe it protects
“individual autonomy.”69 For its part, the Supreme Court, in the 2000
landmark case United States v. Morrison,70 reaffirmed the doctrine as it was
articulated in the Civil Rights Cases.71
Morrison addressed a provision of the Violence Against Women Act
that offered a federal remedy to victims of gender–motivated violence.72
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist said the
Commerce Clause did not authorize such a provision and reviewed
Congress’s powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.73 He
acknowledged the “enduring vitality of the Civil Rights Cases” and adopted
their description of Congress’s powers under Section 5.74 He said the
provision at issue was “directed not at any State or state actor, but at
individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias.”75
As one group of commentators put it:
[D]espite abundant congressional findings regarding disparate
treatment on the basis of gender by state officials, Chief Justice
Rehnquist deemed the intended remedy “simply not ‘corrective in
its character, adapted to counteract and redress the operation of
such prohibited [s]tate laws or proceedings of [s]tate officers.’”
Thus, the Court invalidated an attempt by Congress to remedy
violations of equal protection—otherwise a permissible exercise
67. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1260.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 1261.
70. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
71. Id. at 602; see also State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10,
at 1262 n.56 (“If there is a single person responsible for the current, confining idea of state
action, it is Rehnquist.” (quoting David J. Barron, Privatizing the Constitution: State Action
and Beyond, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 345, 346 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006))).
72. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601–02.
73. Id. at 598.
74. Id. at 624.
75. Id. at 626.
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of its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment, even
under the Civil Rights Cases—because it targeted private
individuals rather than the states and state officials responsible for
the violations. Regardless of whether the provision furthered the
ends envisioned in the Fourteenth Amendment, it failed to satisfy
the formal requirement of state action.76

For these and other reasons, Professor Mark Tushnet believes the state
action doctrine is “distracting us from paying attention to what truly
matters.”77 He and Professor Gary Peller have called for the doctrine’s
abandonment, rejecting the public/private distinction’s logic because
“[e]very exercise of ‘private’ rights in a liberal legal order depends on the
potential exercise of state power to prevent other private actors from
interfering with the rights holder,” and thus “no region of social life . . . can
be marked off as ‘private’ and free from governmental regulation.”78 Taking
that argument to its logical conclusion, Tushnet says the doctrine’s
abandonment could “require the government to remedy de facto burdens on
constitutional rights.”79 That would mean constitutional rights serve
substantive interests that, “when threatened, may require action on the part
of the government.”80
Morrison is the latest word from the U.S. Supreme Court on the state
action doctrine, once again making violations of constitutional rights by a
private actor a “conceptual impossibility.” This Article does not go as far as
abandoning the doctrine, as Professors Tushnet and Geller advocate, but
instead would support its reformulation to enable judges, as explained
below, to balance the rights of property owners with those of property users.
C.

FREE EXPRESSION AND PRIVATE SPACES

In light of that background, it might seem strange to apply the First
Amendment to privately owned spaces. Doing so creates a tension between
property rights and expressive rights. So far, however, those rights have
coexisted relatively peacefully because “spaces traditionally understood to
be public have historically been publicly owned,”81 a reality that today is
changing. New forums for public expression are developing apart from the
76. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1262–63
(citations omitted).
77. Id. at 1263.
78. Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO.
L.J. 779, 789 (2004).
79. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1264.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1303.
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classic public square, and their connection to state actors is tenuous, if not
nonexistent.82
Platforms like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter defy easy classification
in this area.83 To the extent they offer free public access and a place to
engage in expressive activities, they operate as a virtual public forum—but,
of course, their ownership is private. Thus, they are not unlike private
shopping malls, which historically have had “dual public and private
characteristics.”84 A line of cases addressing the application of federal and
state free expression protections to private shopping malls has produced
varied results, showing that the “balance between the values of autonomy
and free speech reflects different conceptions of what makes a mall
‘public’”: the nature of its ownership or the nature of its use.85
Marsh v. Alabama,86 decided in 1946, was the first case to address the
application of free expression protections to privately owned spaces. 87 The
issue before the Supreme Court was whether Alabama could punish a
person who distributed religious literature in a company–owned town
against the town management’s wishes.88 The Justices held that the town,
which was owned and operated by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, could
not freely restrict expressive activity there, because the company town was
the functional equivalent of a public municipality.89 Justice Hugo Black,
writing for the majority, noted that whether a private or public entity “owns
or possesses the town[,] the public in either case has an identical interest in
the functioning of the community in such manner that the channels of
communication remain free.”90
Twenty years later, the Supreme Court extended those principles to
privately owned shopping malls.91 In 1968, in Amalgamated Food
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., the Court decided
whether peaceful picketing of a business located in a private shopping
center could be enjoined because it invaded the property rights of the

82. Id.
83. See id. (citing the modern shopping mall as an example).
84. See id.
85. Id. at 1303–04.
86. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
87. Id. at 502.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 507.
90. Id.
91. See Amalgamated Food Emps. Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308,
319–20 (1968).
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shopping center’s owners.92 The Justices held that peaceful picketing “in a
location open generally to the public” was protected by the First
Amendment.93 The Court said the shopping center served “as the
community business block.”94
After that, the Court decided Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner in 1972.95 The issue
was whether “the right of a privately owned shopping center to prohibit the
distribution of handbills on its property when the handbilling [wa]s
unrelated to the shopping center’s operations.”96 The Justices narrowed
Logan Valley by ruling that the First Amendment did not protect expressive
activity in a private shopping mall unless the activity was “directly related
in its purpose to the use to which the shopping center property was being
put.”97
Finally, the Court reversed Logan Valley in the 1976 case Hudgens v.
NLRB,98 holding that the First Amendment “guarantee of free expression
has no part to play in a case” where the speech activities occur at a privately
owned shopping center.99 The Court held that a shopping center was not the
“functional equivalent” of a municipality because it did not possess all of
the attributes of one.100 Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the majority, said
a stronger showing of state action was necessary because the First
Amendment is a check “on state action, not on action by the owner of
private property used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only.”101
Lloyd Corp. and Logan Valley represent a significant narrowing of the state
action doctrine.
Notably, as the U.S. Supreme Court developed that line of cases,
California state courts confronted similar issues,102 developing a body of
law that departed in critical ways from the federal system’s formalistic
approach to state action. California law is useful to consider here for that
reason, as an alternative to the federal approach—and because many of the
major technology companies discussed in this Article, such as Facebook
and YouTube, are physically based in California and operate in the shadow
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 309.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 319.
407 U.S. 551 (1972).
Id. at 552.
Id. at 563 (quoting Amalgamated Food Emps. Union, 391 U.S. at 320 n.9).
424 U.S. 507 (1976).
Id. at 507.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 519
State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1305.
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of its laws (although, obviously, these companies are subject to the laws of
all the places where they operate).
Four years before Logan Valley, the California Supreme Court ruled that
the First Amendment protected expressive activity in privately owned
shopping malls based on their “public character.”103 Then, after the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Logan Valley and Hudgens, “California was forced
to rule that the First Amendment did not require mall owners to
accommodate private speech.”104 That paved the way for Robins v.
Pruneyard Shopping Center105 in 1979, in which the California Supreme
Court addressed whether soliciting signatures at a private shopping center
was protected by the state constitution.106 The justices answered in the
affirmative, supporting more expansive state free speech rights than those
offered by the First Amendment.107
The California Supreme Court pointed to the difference in the
commands of the state and federal constitutions.108 The California provision
commanded that “[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his or
her sentiments on all subjects,” while the federal provision commanded that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”109 Thus,
the state action doctrine did not control Pruneyard’s outcome, and
ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Pruneyard in the face of a
federal constitutional challenge.110
The issue in the federal case was whether California’s constitutional
provisions permitting people to exercise free speech rights at a privately
owned shopping center violated either the owner’s property rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments or the owner’s free speech rights under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.111 The justices held that Tanner did
not limit a state’s authority to adopt “individual liberties more expansive
than those conferred by the Federal Constitution” and that states “may adopt
reasonable restrictions on private property so long as [they] do not amount
to a taking without just compensation.”112 This is significant because it
103. See Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers’ Union,
394 P.2d 921, 924 (Cal. 1964).
104. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1305.
105. 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979).
106. Id. at 342.
107. Id. at 347.
108. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1305.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980)).
111. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 88.
112. Id. at 81.
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means a state does not necessarily violate property rights by protecting
expressive activity on private property.113
Later, the California Supreme Court, in the 2001 case Golden Gateway
Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Association,114 reaffirmed Pruneyard
when it addressed whether California law requires state action as a threshold
for free expression violations.115 The court said it is required but can be
satisfied when private property is “freely and openly accessible to the
public.”116 This means California’s state action doctrine focuses on a
property’s public use rather than its ownership. Golden Gateway, in effect
echoing Pruneyard, cited the differences between the state and federal
constitutions to account for California’s divergence from federal law.117
But, interestingly, the opinion emphasized that California’s doctrinal
approach, in concentrating on the public nature of a property, was consistent
with the conception of state action in federal constitutional history.118
The California Supreme Court noted that the distinction between
government and private conduct “has been a hallmark of American
constitutional theory since the birth of our nation.”119 And the court
remarked that this distinction serves two important purposes:
First, this demarcation is necessary to preserve private autonomy.
“[B]y exempting private action from the reach of the
Constitution’s prohibitions, [the state action limitation] stops the
Constitution short of preempting individual liberty—of denying
to individuals the freedom to make certain choices. . . . Such
freedom is basic under any conception of liberty, but it would be
lost if individuals had to conform their conduct to the
Constitution’s demands.”
Second, a state action limitation safeguards the separation of
powers embodied in every American constitution by recognizing
the limited ability of courts “to accomplish goals which are
essentially legislative and political.” “Without a state action
limitation, the courts will possess the same authority as the
legislature to limit individual freedoms, but will lack the degree
of accountability which should accompany such power.” As a
result, absent a state action requirement, “the ‘rule of law’ would
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1306.
29 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
See id. at 809–10.
Id. at 810.
See id. at 809.
See id. at 808.
Id.
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approach in Sir Ivor Jennings’ caustic but realistic phrase, ‘rule by
the judges alone.’”120

Thus, state action retains its place in California’s constitutional scheme,
but Pruneyard established—and Golden Gateway affirmed—that
California’s doctrine differs from that of the federal system. It is worth
noting that very few states have followed California’s lead to offer more
speech protections than the First Amendment.121 Despite speech provisions
similar to California’s, seventeen state supreme courts have held that a more
traditional state–action theory, such as Morrison’s, is required to bring
speech claims under their constitutions.122 New Jersey is the only state that
(to some degree) has followed California.123 Balancing property and speech
rights on a case–by–case basis, New Jersey has extended private–property
speech protections to a variety of contexts, including private colleges and
universities, residential communities, and hallways in residential
buildings.124
These cases indicate that “the doctrine is still being shaped at the state
level as courts continue to face difficult factual applications of their theories
of state action.”125 One such application, regardless of level, involves
platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. They all share some of the
characteristics of traditional public spaces, but they all are privately owned,
too. The implications of their public and private characteristics are explored
in the next section of this Article.
D.

A MATTER OF VALUES

At the heart of any democratic legal system is a matrix of principles and
values concerned with such things as equality and due process that apply
generally, without regard to specific legal facts. For example, in the U.S.
legal system, it is a foundational aspiration to provide equal justice under
law,126 secured chiefly through the Equal Protection Clause and the
“neutrality and independence of the judiciary.”127 Similarly, underlying
every legal rule or standard is a matrix of values concerned with discrete

120. Id. (citations omitted).
121. See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1306.
122. Id. at 1306–07.
123. Id. at 1307.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of
Arbitration, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 290 (2004).
127. Id. at 291.
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matters like property rights or free expression interests that apply when
specific facts implicate them.128 For example, subjecting a private actor to
liability for a First Amendment violation creates tension between the values
of autonomy and property rights and that of free expression. Put it in the
context of this Article, there is tension between the autonomy and property
rights of the third–party platforms (e.g. Twitter and Facebook) and the free
expression rights of their users. Before addressing this tension, however, a
more general discussion is necessary.
Recall that California’s approach to the state action doctrine diverges
from the federal system’s approach as well as the approach of most state
courts that have addressed state action requirements.129 These divergent
approaches reflect varying conceptions of what it means to protect
expressive activities on private property and different ideas of what values
the state action doctrine ought to protect.130 California’s theory may be
“anomalous,” but it reflects the “larger national dialogue about free
expression and state action in public spaces.”131 One way to understand the
divergent approaches, as noted earlier, is to focus on sources of authority.132
California relied on its own constitution to expand free speech protections
beyond those of the First Amendment.133
Sources of authority, however, do not fully account for the
divergence.134 After all, the majority of state constitutions around the
country contain speech and press provisions “virtually identical” to
California’s, and yet the majority have rejected California’s approach.135
For example, New York’s constitution is so similar that the California
Supreme Court declared in Golden Gateway that New York’s constitutional

128. See Jordan Daci, Legal Principles, Legal Values and Legal Norms: Are They the
Same or Different?, 2010 ACADEMICUS–INT’L SCI. J. 109, 110–11 (2010).
129. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1308.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See also Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Private Property, Public Property: Shopping
Centers and Expressive Freedom in the States, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1229, 1261 (1999) (“Little
can be gained by contrasting the claimed nonspecificity of the First Amendment’s wording
with the greater protection said to be found in state expressive freedom guarantees.”).
135. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1308; see also
Gregory C. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1145, 1163–65 (2007)
(highlighting the similarity of free speech clauses in the constitutions of California, New
York, and Iowa).

PETERS_JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

1006

2/6/2018 12:30 PM

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:989

history was relevant to its own interpretation of California’s constitution.136
Meanwhile, New York, by contrast, characterized California’s state action
approach as “hardly persuasive authority.”137
California’s approach also borrows from First Amendment law.138 As
discussed above, the early California cases made use of the First
Amendment, and a more recent California case, Fashion Valley Mall v.
NLRB, decided in 2007, was framed as an application of Pruneyard,139
which the California Supreme Court described as an extension of the early
cases’ “First Amendment-based jurisprudence.”140 More broadly, the
California Supreme Court has referred in its opinions to fundamental First
Amendment concepts,141 likening the private mall in Fashion Valley, for
example, to “sidewalks of the central business district which, have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public.”142 Such language
echoes Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, in which the U.S.
Supreme Court defined traditional public forums.143 All meaning: the
California Supreme Court’s position does not appear to be that the state
constitution recognizes new types of public spaces—rather, it appears to be
that shopping malls are new public forums, as that concept is understood
vis–à–vis the First Amendment.144
Of course, this does not mean Pruneyard, Golden Gateway, and
Fashion Valley are primarily or only First Amendment cases.145 It means
simply that there is appreciable overlap between California and federal
doctrine in this area, an overlap that illustrates the “problem of defining
public space[s] in today’s world.”146 The U.S. Supreme Court focuses on
ownership to distinguish private and public property, 147 while the California
Supreme Court focuses on how a space is used.148 These opposing
conceptions of “public” are the result of conscious choices based partly on
136. See Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797, 804–
05 (Cal. 2001).
137. SHAD All. v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 n.5 (N.Y. 1985).
138. See Fashion Valley Mall, L.L.C. v. NLRB, 172 P.3d 742, 749 (Cal. 2007) (citing
Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 12 P.3d 720 (Cal. 2000)).
139. Id. at 745.
140. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1309.
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing Fashion Valley Mall, 172 P.3d at 745).
143. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939).
144. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1309–10.
145. Id. at 1310.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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the values underlying them.149 The U.S. Supreme Court has chosen to
emphasize the values of autonomy and property rights, and the California
Supreme Court has chosen to emphasize the free speech rights of
“individual speakers against powerful private actors.”150 But these values
do conflict in numerous ways.
On the one hand, California’s approach pits the expression rights of
patrons and owners against one another in a way that the U.S. Supreme
Court’s approach does not.151 First, requiring mall owners to allow
expressive activities on their property could interfere with the owners’
marketing activities that are essential to the mall’s commercial purpose.152
This might put the owners in the discomfiting position of serving as the
“host for [their] own roasting.”153 Second, to the extent that mall owners are
required to host speech they find disagreeable, California’s approach could
compel the owners to promote beliefs, at least indirectly, that they do not
share, creating a potential conflict with post–Pruneyard cases holding that
states cannot require private actors to provide forums for expression that
those actors find disagreeable.154
On the other hand, it is not clear that the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach
offers a better way to balance the competing values. One team of
commentators put it this way:
As shopping centers continue to adopt more characteristics of the
town square, a theory that cannot protect rights in these locations
is problematic in light of our nation’s history of protecting free
discourse in the spaces where such speech actually occurs. The
more accessible owners make their property, the more public it
becomes; California’s approach is appealing because it recognizes
that even private property can assume public characteristics. Even
conceding the difficulty of balancing the rights of owners and
speakers, the bright-line rule of government ownership can
become a simplistic and “absurd basis for choosing between the
two liberties,” because conditioning free speech protections on the

149. Id. at 1310–11.
150. Id. at 1311.
151. Id. at 1312.
152. Gregory C. Sisk, Returning to the Pruneyard: The Unconstitutionality of StateSanctioned Trespass in the Name of Speech, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 389, 396 (2009).
153. Id.
154. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1312
(referencing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557
(1995)).
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identity of the property owner provides an artificially clear line
that can minimize the merits of competing rights claims.155

Such arguments are meritorious and animate Part IV’s suggestions for a
state–action theory suitable for the digital world, where so much speech on
matters of public concern occurs in privately owned spaces like Facebook
and YouTube. A state–action theory for private spaces can have serious
implications for the ability to speak freely online, whether the source of
authority is state or federal. In fact, the scope of a modern state–action
theory can make the difference between speaking out and not. Thus, there
is a need for a debate over its proper scope because “[a]s the public becomes
more private, and the private becomes more public, the contours of the state
action doctrine may come to define the contours of our most basic
constitutional rights.”156
E.

PUBLIC FORUM LAW

This Section explores public forum law to analyze the similarity, if any,
between public forums—property historically associated with the exercise
of expressive rights—and third–party platforms like Facebook and Twitter.
The analysis in this Section is general in nature and provides the framework
for evaluating the public character of private property that will be used in
the next part to consider whether the state action doctrine, in its current
form, forecloses the First Amendment’s application to third–party
platforms.
Pruneyard relied on the functional equivalence of a privately owned
shopping center and a traditional public forum (i.e., the “downtown” or
“central business district”).157 The opinion emphasized the center’s “open
and unrestricted invitation to the public to congregate freely,” thereby
exempting “an individual homeowner” from the ambit of California’s free
expression provision, “because individual homes are not freely and openly
accessible to the public.”158 As discussed above, this means that the
application of California’s free expression provision on private property
depends on “the public character of the property.”159 Golden Gateway
affirmed this approach by holding that “the actions of a private property

155. Id. at 1313 (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 1250 (citations omitted).
157. See Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797, 809–
10 (Cal. 2001) (citing Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 346 (Cal. 1979)).
158. Id. at 809.
159. Id.
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owner constitute state action for purposes of California’s free speech clause
only if the property is freely and openly accessible to the public.”160
It is worthwhile, then, to explore the law of public forums and to
consider the similarity between third–party Internet platforms, such as
Facebook and Twitter, and public forums, such as public sidewalks and
parks. The goal is to understand the extent of their functional equivalence.
This is also valuable because the California Supreme Court, which referred
to the public character of private property as a necessary condition of state
action, followed lower court decisions that used Pruneyard to compare
various types of private property and public forums161:
[O]ur Courts of Appeal have consistently held that privately
owned medical centers and their parking lots are not functionally
equivalent to a traditional public forum for purposes of
California’s free speech clause because, among other things, they
are not freely open to the public. Our lower courts have also
suggested that an apartment complex does not resemble a
traditional public forum because it “is a place where the public is
generally excluded.”162

Under Hague and its progeny, the right to express your views in public
places is fundamental to a free society, and certain public property is so
historically associated with the exercise of expressive rights that the
property cannot be closed, not entirely, to constitutionally protected
expression—to speeches, meetings, parades, protests, and the like.163 The
basic reason is that the property may be owned by the government, but it is
held “in trust” for the public.164 That means members of the public should
have as much right to speak there as they would on their own property.165
Likewise, when the government chooses to open forums to the public, it
should not be permitted to skew public debate there by regulating
viewpoints.166 But on most public property, the government should be
permitted “to regulate speech [there] in order to make its use of the property
more efficient” (after all, speech can distract people, interfere with traffic
flow, and so on—thus, content–neutral time, place, and manner limitations

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 810.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939).
Id.
VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 603.
Id.
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are permissible).167 Their historical significance is what makes public
forums special, as explained by Justice Owen Roberts in Hague: “Wherever
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.”168
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has divided public property into five
categories.169 The first is the traditional public forum, which includes
“government property that has traditionally been available for public
expression,” such as sidewalks and parks.170 The second is the designated
public forum, which includes “‘government property that has [been] . . .
intentionally opened up for [the] purpose’ of being a public forum.” 171 The
third is the limited public forum, which includes government property
“limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of
certain subjects.”172 The fourth is the nonpublic forum, which includes all
other government–owned property not used by the government for
speaking.173 And, finally, the fifth is “[n]ot a forum at all,” which includes
government property that the government uses to speak (e.g. through a
government–owned television channel).174
Importantly, expressive activities in traditional and designated public
forums are subject to reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.175 To
be constitutional, such regulations must be content neutral,176 narrowly
tailored,177 serve a significant government interest,178 and leave open ample
167. Id.
168. 307 U.S. at 515.
169. VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 601.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citations omitted).
172. Id. Earlier cases called this category a designated public forum and said the test
was the one used when the government acted as sovereign, except the government could
limit such a forum to the purposes for which it was created. Id. In practice, however, that
was effectively the same as applying the “reasonable-and-viewpoint-neutral test” (after all,
speaker and subject–matter limitations were permitted). Id. More recent cases, such as
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661,
662 (2010), and Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 461 (2009), have treated
the limited public forum as a separate category. VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 601.
173. VOLOKH, supra note 11, at 602.
174. Id. at 603.
175. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
176. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984).
177. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
178. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536
U.S. 150, 175 (2002).
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alternative forums or channels of communication for protected
expression.179 Meanwhile, expressive activities in limited and nonpublic
forums can be subject to restrictions that are both reasonable and viewpoint
neutral.180 In some such forums, like military bases and prisons, which are
nonpublic, the government enjoys even broader authority to restrict
expressive activities.181 And in the fifth public–property category—“not a
forum at all”—the government acts as the speaker and may decide what
speech to allow, even based on viewpoint.182
It is important to keep these concepts in mind when considering, in the
next part of this Article, the propriety of the First Amendment’s application
to third–party platforms like Facebook and Twitter. Whether such platforms
are seen as the functional equivalent of a public forum is legally significant
and instructive in evaluating the public character of privately owned
property.183
III.

APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THIRD–PARTY
PLATFORMS

As noted in Part I, the Internet’s architecture relies on intermediaries to
transport, host, and index content,184 enabling Internet users to speak
online—and giving the intermediaries tremendous power to shape the

179. See, e.g., Heffron v. Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981).
180. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S.
661, 679 (2010).
181. See generally Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) (prisons); Brown v.
Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (military bases).
182. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 667, 676–78
(1998).
183. It is useful to say a few words about 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability for private actors.
A comprehensive discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, but the statute authorizes
the filing of a civil action against a state actor for a deprivation of civil or constitutional
rights. Jeremy Brown, Pan, Tilt, Zoom: Regulating the Use of Video Surveillance of Public
Places, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 755, 780 n.166 (2008). Although the statute’s language
does not include any immunities, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted immunity to
government officials where there exists a “tradition of immunity . . . so firmly rooted in the
common law and . . . supported by such strong policy reasons” that Congress would not
have abolished that tradition upon enacting § 1983. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 164
(1992) (quoting Owen v. City of Indep., 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980)). Immunity reflects the
government’s interest in managing the risk of “distraction of officials from their
governmental duties” and of “deterrence of able people from public service.” See Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982). This is relevant because it is possible for private
actors like YouTube and Facebook to be deemed state actors under § 1983.
184. See Ardia, supra note 2, at 377. ͒
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public discourse.185 Third–party platforms like Facebook and Twitter
conduct “private worldwide speech ‘regulation’” as they draft and enforce
their respective platforms’ content rules.186 “They decide what types of
content may be posted, whether to remove certain content in response to
user requests, whether to remove content that allegedly violates the law, and
how to display and prioritize various content types using algorithms, all
against the background of democratic values and business interests.”187 The
platforms are developing what amounts to a de facto free speech
jurisprudence, and the crux of this Article is an exploration of whether the
state action doctrine permits, and ought to permit, the First Amendment’s
application to such platforms. This Part employs the concepts explored in
the foregoing Sections, and it includes both descriptive and normative
perspectives.
The focus of this analysis is limited to one type of Internet intermediary:
third–party platforms.188 To compare Internet intermediaries and how they
facilitate online speech, Professor David Ardia developed a trifurcated
classification system for them, including: (1) communication conduits,
which transport data across the network; (2) content hosts, which store,
cache, or otherwise provide access to content; and (3) search and
application providers, which index or filter content without necessarily
hosting it.189 The second classification includes web–hosting services and
third–party platforms190 that provide access to content by operating between
primary publishers and audiences.191 More specifically, web–hosting
services allow users to host their own webpages, and third–party
platforms—like Facebook and Twitter—offer various services to users that
enable them to share content and network socially.192 Content hosts are the
focus of this Article because they have knowledge of, and control over, the
185. See id. Also playing a major role are common law principles of intermediary
liability and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. See, e.g., Aniket Kesari,
Chris Hoofnagle & Damon McCoy, Deterring Cybercrime: Focus on Intermediaries, 32
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2017); Shahrzad T. Radbod, Craigslist—A Case for
Criminal Liability for Online Service Providers?, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 597 (2010).
They are worthy of discussion, but they are not the focus of this Article.
186. Benesch & MacKinnon, supra note 4. ͒
187. See generally Jonathan Peters, All the News That’s Fit to Leak, in TRANSPARENCY
2.0: DIGITAL DATA AND PRIVACY IN A WIRED WORLD 117, 117–29 (Charles N. Davis &
David Cuillier eds., 2014).
188. See Ardia, supra note 2, at 386.
189. Id. at 386–87. ͒
190. Id. at 387. ͒
191. Id. at 388–89. ͒
192. See id. at 389. ͒
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content of the speech they intermediate.193 Content hosts—and specifically
third–party platforms—have billions of users and “are many speakers’
principal means of online communication.”194 Thus, content hosts truly
stand to operate as arbiters of free expression online.195 As such, the rest of
this Article considers whether the state action doctrine permits application
of the First Amendment to third–party platforms.
A.

TO SAY WHAT THE LAW IS

According to the rules laid out in Hudgens and Morrison, as well as
those laid out in the Lugar–Edmonson framework, the communications
activities on third–party platforms would not satisfy state action
requirements for federal purposes.196 Morrison reaffirmed the narrow and
193. See id. ͒
194. See Third-Party Platforms, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/freespeech-weak-link#platforms (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
195. By contrast, communication conduits have no direct knowledge of, and very
limited ͒ control over, the content of the speech they facilitate. Ardia, supra note 2, at 387.
And search and application providers have limited knowledge of, and limited control over,
the content of the speech they intermediate, insofar as search engines and filtering software
select search results based on neutral computer algorithms and thematic preferences that
represent the companies’ judgments about what information to present and how to do so.
Eugene Volokh, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (May 9, 2012, 2:37 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/05/09/firstamendment-protection-for-search-engine-search-results/.
196. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507, 519 (1976). It is possible, but not plausible, that a court would use the Lugar–
Edmonson framework to find state action. The chief concern would be the three principles
that guide the analysis of the second step. To satisfy the first principle, the argument would
be that content hosts rely on governmental assistance and benefits on the theory that, but
for the government–financed research that led to ARPANET, there would be no Internet.
This is likely not a winning argument because other than the ancestor connection, content
hosts are independent from the government. In addition, from a policy point of view, it is
not sensible to allow an actor’s mixed public–private origins to be sufficient to satisfy the
principle that the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits. Ardia, supra note 2,
at 377. In the case of content hosts, it ignores the totality of the circumstances that today
the Internet exists on a layered architecture of “privately owned Web sites, privately owned
servers, privately owned routers, and privately owned backbones.” Id. Because of the
federal approach’s formalism, ownership is key. Next, to satisfy the second principle, the
argument would be that content hosts are performing a traditional governmental function
on the theory that the government has played a role in the online environment by supporting
its creation. However, third–party Internet platforms store, cache, or otherwise provide
access to content, operating between primary publishers and their audiences. That is not a
traditional government function in the offline or online world. Finally, to satisfy the third
principle, the argument would be that the injury caused—the deprivation of free speech
interests—is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority on the
theory that, but for the government–financed research that led to ARPANET and later the
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traditional approach articulated in the Civil Rights Cases, which treated the
violation of the constitutional rights of one private actor by another as a
“conceptual impossibility.”197 Hudgens, meanwhile, reversed a line of cases
extending state action to private actors.198 Justice Potter Stewart, writing for
the majority, said the First Amendment “has no part to play in a case” where
the expressive activities occur at a privately owned shopping center.199 The
Court said such a center is not “functionally similar” to a municipality
because it does not possess all of the attributes of one.200 To argue that a
shopping center is “dedicated to certain types of public use” because it is
“open to the public” and “serves the same purposes as a ‘business district’
of a municipality” is to go too far.201 Under Hudgens, the “Constitution by
no means requires such an attenuated doctrine of dedication of private
property to public use.”202
Hudgens also dismissed the applicability of the theoretically close
Marsh decision, which involved a company town with “all of the attributes
of a state-created municipality” that exercised “semi-official municipal
functions as a delegate of the State.”203 The company town’s owner, in
effect, was performing “the full spectrum of municipal powers and stood in
the shoes of the State.”204 In the context of third–party platforms, “there is
no comparable assumption or exercise of municipal functions or power.”205
They perform a variety of functions to facilitate speech on blogging sites
like Tumblr, social networks like Facebook, photo–hosting services like
Flickr, and video–hosting services like YouTube.206 They play a crucial role
in the distribution of speech and in facilitating a “speaker’s broad reach and

Internet, there would have been no injury at all. However, the Internet was designed to be
distributed and decentralized, which means platforms are not required to seek the approval
of any central authority to host content. In that sense, the platforms have virtual free will,
and thus the responsibility for their actions cannot extend to the government. All of that
said, it is important to note that these results come from applications of the law as it exists,
not how it ought to be. For a discussion of how the law ought to be, see infra Section III.B.
197. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1257; see also
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 599.
198. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 507. ͒
199. Id. at 521. ͒
200. Id. at 519. ͒
201. Id. at 519 (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568–69 (1972)). ͒
202. Id. ͒
203. Id. ͒
204. Id. ͒
205. See id. ͒
206. See Ardia, supra note 2, at 388. ͒
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a listener’s varied choices.”207 And, from a technological standpoint, they
store, cache, or otherwise provide access to Internet content, operating
between speakers and their audiences.208 But despite their significance, they
certainly do not have all of the attributes of a municipality that the U.S.
Supreme Court required under Marsh for state action, such as “residential
buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a
‘business block’ on which business places are situated.”209 For these
reasons, under Hudgens and Morrison, as well as Marsh, the federal state
action doctrine would foreclose the First Amendment’s application to third–
party platforms.
The same result can be reached under the Lugar–Edmonson framework,
lending support to commentators who have said the doctrine’s chief concern
is to balance public interests and private harms.210 The framework requires
a two–step inquiry: (1) to determine “whether the claimed constitutional
deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its
source in state authority”;211 and (2) to determine “whether the private party
charged with the deprivation can be described as a state actor.”212 Under the
second step, three principles are relevant: (1) “the extent to which the actor
relies on governmental assistance and benefits;” (2) “whether the actor is
performing a traditional governmental function;” and (3) “whether the
injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of
governmental authority.”213
To apply that framework and those principles in the context of third–
party platforms, consider a February 2011 incident when Facebook
removed a drawing posted by the New York Academy of Art to its
Facebook page that depicted a topless woman.214 Imagine the Academy
wanted to file a legal complaint. The creation and public exhibition of art is
protected First Amendment activity, so the first step under the Lugar–
Edmonson framework would be satisfied: the “deprivation has resulted
from the exercise of a right . . . having its source in state authority.” 215 The
second step, however, is a different story. In other words, Facebook could
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
PM), ͒
215.

Id. at 389. ͒
Id. at 387. ͒
See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946). ͒
Reuben, supra note 36, at 612. ͒
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991). ͒
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 51 (1992). ͒
Id. ͒
See Adrian Chen, How to Get Boobs on Facebook, GAWKER (Feb. 19, 2011, 1:17
http://gawker.com/5765057/how-to-get-a-boob-on-facebook.
See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51. ͒
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not be described as a state actor, because it does not satisfy the three
principles under the framework’s second step.
First, Facebook does not rely to any appreciable extent on
“governmental assistance and benefits.”216 Although government–financed
researchers planted the Internet’s seeds, and the company benefits today
from certain government–created tax incentives, Facebook is otherwise
independent from the government. The vast majority of the company’s
revenue comes from advertising,217 and its other major sources of revenue
have included private investments and its 2012 initial public offering.218 In
addition, the company is managed by a group of executives and directors,
all free from government assistance or interference, except for laws and
regulations of general applicability (e.g. rules governing the sale of
securities).219
Second, Facebook is not “performing a traditional governmental
function”220 by storing, caching, or providing access to content.221 The
government traditionally has played no such role in the online environment.
Here, the closest offline analogs are bookstores and libraries, which
intermediate all manner of print publications, from books to pamphlets and
magazines—and beyond.222 Public archives are a possible analog, too. The
government traditionally has not owned or operated book or media stores,
and even though public libraries receive government funding and are staffed
by civil servants, in effect making their operation a governmental function,
they are distinguishable from third–party platforms because such libraries
are governed by a board that serve the public interest.223 The board’s
mission is critical to the libraries’ functioning, and there is no equivalent for
third–party platforms.224 Similarly, public archives are operated to serve the
216. See id. ͒
217. Anita Balakrishnan, Facebook Ad Revenue Shoots Up 53%, Sending Shares
Climbing, CNBC (Feb. 2, 2017, 11:16 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/01/facebookearnings-q4-2016.html.
218. Paul Vigna, What’s Facebook Really Worth? Try $13.80, WALL ST. J. (May 25,
2012, 1:14 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2012/05/25/whats-facebook-reallyworth-try-13-80/.
219. See Owen Thomas, Here Are All the Top Executives Who Actually Run Facebook,
BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 2, 2012, 3:10 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-seniormanagement-team-2012-8.
220. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51. ͒
221. Ardia, supra note 2, at 387. ͒
222. Id. at 388. ͒
223. RICHARD E. RUBIN, FOUNDATIONS OF LIBRARY AND INFORMATION SCIENCE 299
(2000).͒
224. See id.
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public interest, and many of the documents they house are required by law
to be preserved and publicly accessible (e.g. under the Presidential Records
Act). That is not true for the data hosted by third–party platforms.
Third, “the injury caused”—the deprivation of free speech rights—“is
[not] aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental
authority.”225 In fact, it is not aggravated at all by government. Facebook’s
content–policy team is led by employees,226 and working under them are
content moderators, mostly independent contractors, who review
complaints about content that allegedly violates the platform’s rules. 227 At
the time of the incident involving the New York Academy of Art, those
teams were responding to removal requests by applying rules set out in
Facebook’s “Operations Manual for Live Content Moderators,” produced
by a private consulting firm.228 After removing the drawing posted by the
Academy, Facebook apologized and said the removal was its own
mistake.229 In other words, any injury was caused by Facebook or its agents.
For these reasons, under the Lugar–Edmonson framework, the state action
doctrine would foreclose the First Amendment’s application to third–party
platforms.
Importantly, Facebook is not unique. This Article uses Facebook as an
example because it is the largest third–party platform, but it would be
possible to substitute any number of other platforms, such as Twitter,
YouTube, or Flickr, in place of Facebook. Twitter, especially, has seen its
share of recent content–related controversies—from the bullying of actress–
comedian Leslie Jones that prompted the microblogging site to ban Milo
Yiannopoulos, to the use of Twitter to spread false and misleading claims
during the 2016 presidential election.230 In any case, there are differences
among the third–party platforms but, at a high level of abstraction, they all
serve the same purposes. They store, cache, or otherwise provide access to
225. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51. ͒
https://www.facebook.com/
226. See
Community
Standards,
FACEBOOK,
communitystandards/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
227. Jeffrey Rosen, The Delete Squad, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 28, 2013),
https://newrepublic.com/article/113045/free-speech-internet-silicon-valley-making-rules.
228. See id. ͒
229. Id. ͒
230. See Mike Isaac, Twitter Bans Milo Yiannopoulos in Wake of Leslie Jones’s
Reports of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/20/
technology/twitter-bars-milo-yiannopoulos-in-crackdown-on-abusive-comments.html;
Donie O’Sullivan, Fake News Rife on Twitter During Election Week, Study from Oxford
Says, CNN MONEY (Sept. 28, 2017, 2:06 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/28/media/
twitter-fake-news-election-study/index.html.
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Internet content,231 and they offer a variety of services to users that enable
them to share content and network socially.232 There is no doubt they have
radically democratized publishing. And, for now, there is no doubt that the
state action doctrine does not permit the First Amendment’s application to
such platforms.
B.

TO SAY WHAT THE LAW OUGHT TO BE

As online communication continues to evolve,233 and as content hosts
continue for many people to be the principal means of public
communication,234 a state action theory that fails to protect free speech
interests in such spaces is problematic—especially “in light of our nation’s
history of protecting free discourse in the spaces where such speech actually
occurs.”235 The private is becoming more public, and thus the state action
doctrine may come to define the contours of our fundamental rights.236 That
being said, a state action theory that fails to protect the values of autonomy
and property rights is equally problematic. It would preempt individual
liberty, insofar as it would deny property holders the “freedom to make
certain choices,” such as how a platform wants to operate and the types of
speech it wants to host.237 That freedom is fundamental to any conception
of liberty and would be lost if platforms had to comply strictly with First
Amendment requirements.238 With these concerns in mind, the goal of this
section is to articulate a state action theory suitable for a digital world
“where public title and public use overlap with less frequency.”239
It is tempting to adopt California’s more liberal approach to state action
because of its sensitivity to free expression interests. After all, the
expressive uses of third–party platforms can be consequential. An
anonymous blogger covering police corruption might use a hosting service
like Blogger to share what she knows with the world.240 A group with
unpopular views might assemble on a social networking site like Facebook
231. Ardia, supra note 2, at 387. ͒
232. See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 194. ͒
233. See Rosen, supra note 8, at 260. ͒
234. See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 194.
235. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1313 (citing
͒ Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
236. Id. at 1250.
237. Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal.
2001).
238. Id. ͒
239. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1312. ͒
240. Ardia, supra note 2, at 388.
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to debate those views.241 Citizen journalists might monitor government
power by publishing photos and videos on hosting sites like Flickr and
YouTube.242 Activists might organize protests using Twitter. 243
Drawing on the ideas of Professor Thomas Emerson, such uses of third–
party platforms stand to facilitate self–fulfillment by allowing users to
express themselves; to advance knowledge and discover truth by debating
ideas and sharing content with one another; to achieve a more stable and
adaptable community by being exposed to more ideas and developing
greater tolerance; and to allow users to be involved in the democratic
decision–making process by holding those in power accountable for their
actions.244 Indeed, the accountability of elected officials “interrelates with
participation, in that government accountability makes individual and
public participation meaningful.”245 Thus, all of those uses of third–party
platforms illuminate the value of free expression to the individual (i.e. the
platform user) and the value of free expression to society as a whole (i.e. all
citizens).
A state action theory suitable for the digital world ought to respect the
importance of free expression as a means to personal development and self–
fulfillment—and the role of content hosts in providing access to such
expression. Just as a liberal approach to state action threatens a platform’s
autonomy and property rights, a traditional approach that fails to protect
expression where it actually occurs246 can be an “affront to the dignity” of
an individual user.247 After all, without the freedom to search for truth and
discuss questions of right and wrong, individuals are placed, as Emerson
writes, in the “arbitrary control of others.”248
Further, a state action theory suitable for the digital world ought to
respect the freedoms of thought, discussion, and investigation as goods in
their own right, as well as the idea that society benefits from an open
exchange of ideas.249 Whether or not the truth always prevails, it will never
prevail in a legal system that fails to protect the online marketplace for
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970). ͒
245. Reuben, supra note 126, at 288. ͒
246. See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1313 (citing
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
247. EMERSON, supra note 244, at 6. ͒
248. Id. ͒
249. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George
Kateb eds., 2003) (1859).
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expression. This general idea has factored prominently in the case law of
democracies worldwide, from the Handyside case in the European Court of
Human Rights to the Abrams case in the U.S. Supreme Court.250 Moreover,
it is not unreasonable to look at third–party platforms as staples in “the
promotion of civil society,” the “space between purely governmental and
purely private affairs,” where a great deal of “societal interaction” takes
place.251 The interactions in that space encourage “cooperation,
reciprocation, and a sense of common good among citizens at all levels of
national life,”252 an encouragement that would be impossible but for free
expression—the exercise of which occurs increasingly via third–party
platforms. This is an important point because, as Professor Robert Putnam
found, civil society is “just as important to the consolidation of a healthy
democracy as properly functioning political institutions.”253
A state action theory that is blind to the value of free expression to the
individual, the value of free expression to society, the value of civil society
to democracy, and the indispensability of third–party platforms to all of the
above would surely “distract[] us from paying attention to what truly
matters.”254 The federal state action theory is so blind in the context of
third–party platforms. But so is the California theory, which supports more
expansive free expression rights than those afforded by the First
Amendment. Recall that its theory focuses on a private property’s public
use rather than its ownership, and in evaluating a private property’s public
character, Pruneyard relied on the property’s functional equivalence to
traditional public forums.
At a glance, it appears possible for third–party platforms to satisfy
California’s requirements. In many ways, platforms have been replacing
traditional public forums, the public streets and parks that “have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”255 The likes of
Facebook and Twitter have not been held in trust for the public’s use,
because they are privately owned, but they have been used—and dedicated
250. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919); Handyside v. United
Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18–19 (1976).
251. Reuben, supra note 126, at 291–92. ͒
252. Id. at 292. ͒
253. Id.
254. See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1263
(quoting Professor Mark Tushnet).
255. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515. ͒
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to—various expressive purposes, and they have been “freely and openly
accessible to the public.”256 Consider the leading platforms’ policy
statements: Google says it “aim[s] to offer a platform for free expression”
and that it has a “bias in favor of people’s right to free expression in
everything [it does].”257 Former Twitter CEO Dick Costolo once said, “We
think of Twitter as the global town hall” and the “free speech wing of the
free speech party.”258 Facebook says it “give[s] people the power to share
and make the world more open and connected” and to “see the world
through the eyes of others.”259 And YouTube says it “provides a forum for
people to connect, inform, and inspire others across the globe.”260
The problem is that the U.S. Supreme Court has characterized
traditional public forums as “physical property owned or controlled by the
government,”261 so narrowly defining their boundaries that there is little, if
any, room for the recognition of new traditional public forums, such as
third–party platforms.262 That problem is exemplified by International
Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,263 in which the Court held that
airports were not traditional public forums.264 In light of the “lateness with
which the modern air terminal has made its appearance,” the Court wrote,
“it hardly qualifies for the description of having ‘immemorially . . . time out
of mind’ been held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive
activity.”265 Similarly, in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
Educators’ Association, the Court concluded that traditional public forums
arise “by long tradition or by government fiat.”266 No Internet platform
currently could be a product of long tradition, and even though theoretically
this could one day be the case, the Supreme Court’s characterization of
256. Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal.
2001). ͒
257. Rachel Whetstone, Free Expression and Controversial Content on the Web,
GOOGLE ͒ (Nov. 14, 2007), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2007/11/free-expression-andcontroversial.html.
258. Laura Sydell, On Its 7th Birthday, Is Twitter Still the ‘Free Speech Party’?, NPR
(Mar. 21, 2013, 2:57 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/03/21/
174858681/on-its-7th-birthday-is-twitter-still-the-free-speech-party.
259. FACEBOOK, supra note 226. ͒
260. Marc Aaron Melzer, Copyright Enforcement in the Cloud, 21 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 403, 424 n.108 (2011). ͒
261. Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1981 (2011). ͒
262. See id. at 1982–83. ͒
263. 505 U.S. 672 (1992). ͒
264. Id. 680–81. ͒
265. Id. at 680 (citations omitted). ͒
266. 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). ͒
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public forums as “property owned or controlled by the government” would
remain an impediment.
Because of the nexus between traditional public forums and state action
requirements, California’s approach would not be suitable for a digital
world.267 Like the federal approach, it forecloses the First Amendment’s
application to third–party platforms and thus fails to protect “free discourse
in the spaces where [it] actually occurs.”268 In other words, although
California’s state action theory is not blind to the value of free expression
in privately owned spaces, it simply fails to make room for third–party
platforms, which are indispensable to the public discourse in the present
day.
For these reasons, neither the federal nor California state action theory
is adoptable in its entirety. The next Section articulates a hybrid theory
suitable for a digital world—a theory that “reconciles the increasing
privatization of public forums with the rights of property owners.”269
C.

A THEORY SUITABLE FOR A DIGITAL WORLD

At this point in the Article, the state action doctrine has been
disassembled and examined from a variety of angles, and it is time to
reassemble the pieces and to devise a state action theory suitable for a digital
world. Ironically, it requires a return to Marsh, decided in 1946 by the U.S.
Supreme Court—fifty–eight years before Facebook was founded,270 fifty–
nine years before YouTube was founded,271 and sixty years before Twitter
was founded.272 As discussed earlier, Marsh involved a company town with
“all of the attributes of a state-created municipality” that exercised “semiofficial municipal functions as a delegate of the State,” and the U.S.
267. The state constitution is amended regularly, so it would be possible to amend it to
reduce or eliminate its focus on traditional public forums. See Jennie Drage Bowser,
Constitutions: Amend with Care, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 1, 2015),
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/constitution-amend-with-care.aspx
(“Citizens and lawmakers have been far more willing to make serious changes to state
constitutions than to the federal one.”).
268. See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1313 (citing
͒ Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
269. See id. at 1314.
270. Our Mission, FACEBOOK, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited
Sept. 17, 2017) (noting that Facebook was founded in 2004).
271. Melzer, supra note 260.
272. Owen Williams, Twitter Has Lost More Than $2 Billion Since It Was Founded
Twitter Milestones, NEXT WEB (Feb. 29, 2016), https://thenextweb.com/twitter/2016/
02/29/twitter-has-lost-more-than-2-billion-since-it-was-founded/ (noting that Twitter was
founded in 2006).
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Supreme Court ruled that Alabama violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments by forbidding a Jehovah’s Witness from distributing religious
materials in the town. The opinion balanced the autonomy rights of property
owners against the expressive rights of property users, recognizing that
users occupy a “preferred position” in American jurisprudence.273
In short, Marsh should be expanded and read functionally. It held that a
company town and a public municipality were functional equivalents, such
that the company town had to comply with First Amendment
requirements.274 The Court held that the town’s property interests did not
resolve the case, noting that “[t]he more an owner, for his advantage, opens
up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those
who use it.”275 Such a rule is suitable for the digital world because it
recognizes that private property can take on public characteristics, and
unlike the reasoning of Hudgens and Morrison, both written in formalist
terms reflecting the Civil Rights Cases, Marsh does not make ownership
dispositive. Rather, ownership is one factor in a case–by–case balancing of
rights.
Further, Marsh is attractive because even though it permits comparisons
of private and public spaces for state action purposes, unlike in Pruneyard,
the comparisons are not tethered to traditional public forums. First, although
the facts involved the distribution of literature on a sidewalk near a post
office,276 the U.S. Supreme Court has held that such spaces are not
traditional public forums.277 Second, although the case discusses generally
the public character of spaces that are traditional public forums, it also
discusses generally the public character of spaces that are not public forums,
including turnpikes, ferries, and bridges.278 Third, whereas the opinion
discusses the private discharge of public functions and the public character
of private property, it does not limit these concepts to spaces that would be
the functional equivalent of traditional public forums.279
That said, it is necessary to broaden Marsh’s scope—beyond the context
of company towns—to allow courts to compare public and private spaces
on a case–by–case basis. In other words, rather than comparing the
attributes of a particular private space to the attributes of a town, as Marsh
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). ͒
Id. at 507. ͒
Id. at 506. ͒
Id. at 503. ͒
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 721 (1990). ͒
Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506.
Id. at 506–07.
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did, a state action theory based on an expanded Marsh would allow courts
to compare public and private spaces more generally to assess whether a
private space is functionally public. In the free expression context, several
considerations would guide that assessment: (1) the nature of the private
property interests at issue, and (2) whether the space is operated for general
use by the public for expressive purposes, or whether the operation is itself
a public function, either of which would favor a finding of state action. That
approach is protective of property interests and responsive to the realities of
today’s communications landscape—and it reflects the principle that the
more a property owner opens up a space for public use, the more she must
accommodate the rights of property users. It also accounts for values
underlying the California and federal state action theories by considering
private title (the federal emphasis) and public use (the California emphasis).
Accounting for both puts the new approach between the formalism of
Hudgens and the expansiveness of Pruneyard or Fashion Valley. Thus, it is
not only functional, it is consistent with precedent recognizing the “need for
careful balancing and . . . distinctions to ensure adequate protections for
property rights.”280
A functional Marsh–based state action theory for a digital world—
where advances in technology so quickly outpace the law, and where the
lines between the public and private spheres are collapsing—enables the
state action doctrine to adapt to changing realities. This theory also ensures
the primacy of fundamental rights and their relevance to the great problems
of the day. Its basic adaptability empowers judges to take into consideration
the particular and fast–changing attributes of the private online spaces that
serve, as noted earlier, as the primary means of public communication for
many people. And it allows judges to characterize a space as public for state
action purposes, even if the space would not qualify as a traditional public
forum. For those reasons, the theory ensures that as the public becomes
more private, and the private becomes more public, the state action
doctrine’s contours will align with the contours of our fundamental rights.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Answering Professor Black’s call “to talk about [the state action
doctrine] until we settle on a view both conceptually and functionally
right,”281 this Article examined the First Amendment’s role in the private

280. See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1314. ͒
281. Black, supra note 1, at 70.
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sector as “lawyers at Facebook and Google and Microsoft” exercise “more
power over . . . free expression than any king or president or Supreme Court
justice.”282 To that end, the Article analyzed the doctrine’s traditions and
values, its historical distinction between the public and private spheres, and
the law of public forums—ultimately concluding that the state action
doctrine, under its latest reformulation by the U.S. Supreme Court,
forecloses the First Amendment’s application to third–party platforms.
However, the Article went on to suggest a state action theory suitable
for the digital world that could be devised through further judicial revision
of the doctrine or a constitutional amendment. It recognizes that the modern
challenge of applying the doctrine lies where the private and public spheres
meet—and that a state action theory that ignores speech in private digital
spaces is problematic in light of our nation’s history of protecting speech in
the spaces where it actually occurs.283 The new theory uses Marsh as a
foundation because it can be both expanded and read functionally to enable
judges to balance the rights of property owners with those of property users,
accounting for the dynamism of online spaces. Thus, the theory ensures that
as the public becomes more private, and the private becomes more public,
the state action doctrine’s contours will remain aligned with those of our
fundamental rights. And any uncertainty that might come from this more
flexible and functional approach will surely, in time, resolve itself “as the
common law system [begins] to adjudicate cases and the intrinsic limits of
precedent [begin] to take hold.”284
Professor Berman wrote in 2000 that “[d]ebates about the state action
doctrine are arising again in the online context largely because we are facing
the very real possibility that all of cyberspace will become an effectively
private, Constitution-free zone.”285 That possibility has been realized to a
great degree, and the state action doctrine continues to deserve our scholarly
attention. Internet platforms, which increasingly have “a shared
responsibility to help safeguard free expression,”286 are developing a de
facto free speech jurisprudence that underscores the importance of adopting
a state action theory suitable for a digital world “where public title and
public use overlap with less frequency.”287 Indeed, it shows that such a
theory should recognize the value of free speech as a means to personal and
282. Gross & Rosen, supra note 19.
283. See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1313 (citing
͒ Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
284. Berman, supra note 16, at 1308.
285. Id. at 1308.
286. Clinton, supra note 18.
287. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 10, at 1312.
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democratic development and, correspondingly, the role of third–party
platforms in providing access to that speech.

